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Summary
Plan Colombia was developed by former President Pastrana (1998-2002) as a
six-year plan to end Colombia’s long armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and
promote economic and social development.  The Andean Counterdrug Initiative
(ACI) is the primary U.S. program that supports Plan Colombia.  In addition,
Colombia receives assistance from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program
and the Department of Defense’s central counternarcotics account.  ACI funding for
Plan Colombia from FY2000 through FY2005 totals approximately $2.8 billion.
When FMF and DOD assistance is included, the total level of U.S. support to
Colombia is $4.5 billion.  Congress approved the Administration’s request to
continue support for Plan Colombia beyond FY2005, but it also expressed the need
for an evaluation of progress and a plan for future years.
The objectives of Colombia and the United States differ in some aspects,
although there is a significant overlap of goals.  The primary U.S. objective is to
prevent the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, as well as to help Colombia
promote peace and economic development because it contributes to regional security
in the Andes.  The primary objectives of Colombia are to promote peace and
economic development, increase security, and end drug trafficking.  Both U.S. and
Colombian objectives have also evolved over time from a strict counternarcotics
focus to encompass counterterrorism activities.
Because Plan Colombia is a six-year plan that expired at the end of 2005,
Congress has been and will likely continue assessing its progress in light of the
Administration’s request to continue funding the ACI account, the latter having no
statutory end-date.  Congress has expressed the expectation that funding would begin
to decrease in FY2006.  Some Members have also expressed the opinion that the
ratio between interdiction and alternative development should become more
balanced, and that the U.S. role should diminish as Colombia develops more
operational capabilities.
Measurable progress in Colombia’s internal security has been made, as indicated
by decreases in violence and the eradication of drug crops.  After many years of
stable prices, purity, and availability of cocaine and heroin in the United States,
prices for both drugs have increased, whereas purity and availability have decreased.
Military operations against illegally armed groups have intensified, but the main
leftist guerrilla group seems no closer to agreeing to a cease-fire.  The demobilization
of rightist paramilitary fighters is proceeding, but its is doing so amid controversy
with regard to its implementation. 
For more information on Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, see
CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress; CRS Report RL32337
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2005
Assistance; and CRS Report RL33163, Drug Crop Eradication and Alternative
Development in the Andes, all by Connie Veillette.  This report will be updated as
new data become available.
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1 The original plan estimated costs to be $7.5 billion, with $3.5 billion coming from
international donors and the remainder from the government of Colombia.  “Plan Colombia
Fact Sheet,” Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, March 14,
2001.  European countries provide economic and social development funds but do not
consider them to be in support of Plan Colombia.
Plan Colombia:  A Progress Report
Plan Colombia and the 
Andean Counterdrug Initiative
Plan Colombia was developed by former President Pastrana (1998-2002) as a
six-year plan to end the country’s 40-year old armed conflict, eliminate drug
trafficking, and promote economic and social development.  President Uribe (2002-
present) has continued the work of Plan Colombia, but with an increased emphasis
on security concerns.  It was envisioned that a significant portion of the costs of Plan
Colombia would be provided by the international community, although to date, the
United States has been the most significant contributor.1  
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) is the primary U.S. program that
supports Plan Colombia, as well as assistance to other nations in the Andean region.
In addition to ACI funding, Colombia also benefits from the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) program, and the Department of Defense’s central counternarcotics
account.  U.S. support for Plan Colombia began in 2000, when Congress passed
legislation (P.L. 106-246) providing $1.3 billion for the region in interdiction and
development assistance.  ACI funding for Plan Colombia from FY2000 through
FY2005 totals approximately $2.8 billion.  When FMF and DOD assistance is
included, the total level of U.S. support to Colombia is $4.5 billion.  
The Administration requested Congress to continue support for Plan Colombia
beyond FY2005 with an additional $463 million in ACI funds, and $90 million in
FMF for FY2006.  The FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-
102), enacted in November 2005, provided $469.5 million in assistance to Colombia.
The conference report did not earmark FMF funds to Colombia, but the Senate
version approved the Administration’s $90 million request. U.S. resources support
the eradication of coca and opium poppy crops, the interdiction of narcotics
trafficking, and the protection of infrastructure, through the training and material
support for Colombia’s security forces.  U.S. programs also support alternative crop
development and infrastructure development to give coca and opium poppy farmers
alternative sources of income, and institution building programs to strengthen
democracy.  Components of U.S. assistance include human rights training.
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2 Statement of the President, William J. Clinton, Office of the Press Secretary, January 11,
2000.
3 Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State,
Government of Colombia, Office of the Presidency, October 1999. “The government is
committed to consolidating the central responsibilities of the state: promoting democracy
and the rule of law and the monopoly in the application of justice, territorial integrity,
employment, respect for human rights and human dignity, and the preservation of order as
established by political and social rules....  It is central to this strategy to move forward
decisively in partnership with the countries which produce and those which consume illegal
drugs, under the principles of reciprocity and equality.” 
Because Plan Colombia is a six-year plan that expired at the end of 2005,
Congress has been and will likely continue assessing its progress in light of the
Administration request to continue ACI funding, the latter having no statutory end-
date.  The House-passed FY2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818)
expressed concern that the FY2005 budget request increased ACI levels for
Colombia, despite its scheduled conclusion.  The language noted the Committee’s
expectation that the FY2006 request for Colombia would be less.  However, the
FY2006 request essentially maintained the same level of funding for Colombia, $463
million.  The House version of the FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act
(H.R. 3057/H.Rept. 109-152), while essentially approving the Administration’s
request, directed the Secretary of State to report to the Committee on a “future,
multiyear strategy” for Colombia.
The House bill, as well as some individual Members of Congress, expressed the
opinion that the ratio between alternative development and interdiction should be
more balanced.  The FY2006 request maintained the same balance as in FY2005:
$124.8 million for alternative development and institution building; $27.4 million for
rule of law programs; and $310.9 million for interdiction.  However, the FY2006
appropriation increased the amount for alternative development to $131.2 million.
Other Members have suggested the need for an exit strategy that would have
Colombia develop the capabilities to take over the types of operations for which the
United States is now providing support.  The House appropriation bill included report
language that expressed concern with the Colombian government’s ability to assume
more operational and maintenance functions of Plan Colombia.
Objectives
The objectives of Colombia and the United States for Plan Colombia differ in
some aspects, although there is a significant overlap of goals.  The primary U.S.
objective is to prevent the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, as well as to
help Colombia promote peace and economic development because it contributes to
regional security in the Andes.2  The primary objectives of Colombia are to promote
peace and economic development, and increase security.  Addressing drug trafficking
is considered a key aspect of those objectives.3 
The objectives of each country have evolved over time.  This evolution became
evident when President Uribe was elected on a platform of taking a tougher approach
CRS-3
4 The State Department and DOD explain this expanded authority as providing them with
flexibility in situations where there is no clear line between drug and terrorist activity.
5 The ELN and FARC were first designated FTOs in 1997, and subsequently redesignated
in 2001.  The AUC was first designated in 2001.
6 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that 67% of the
world’s cocaine supply was produced in Colombia in 2003.  The State Department’s
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) puts the figure at 80%.
to the illegally armed groups (IAG) that operate in the country and benefit from
participation in drug trafficking.  He vowed not to negotiate with any of the armed
groups until they declared a cease-fire and disarmed.  In addition, Uribe implemented
new laws giving the security forces increased powers, and instituted a one-time tax
to be used to increase the troop strength and capabilities of the Colombian military.
He increasingly equated the guerrillas with drug traffickers and terrorists, and
initiated a military campaign, called Plan Patriota, to recapture guerrilla-controlled
territory.  
U.S. policy has also evolved from a strictly counternarcotics focus to support
for Colombia’s fight against IAGs.  In 2002, the Administration requested, and
Congress approved, expanded authority to use U.S. counternarcotics funds for a
unified campaign to fight both drug trafficking and terrorist organizations in
Colombia.4  The three main armed organizations in Colombia — the leftist
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation
Army (ELN), and the rightist United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) —
have been designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the State Department
[pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132)].5  In 2003 the
FARC and AUC were designated Significant Foreign Narcotics Traffickers under the
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120).  
Assessment of Key Objectives and Issues
Drug Flows to the United States
After many years of stable prices, purity, and availability of cocaine and heroin
in the United States, prices for both drugs have increased in 2005, whereas purity and
availability have decreased.   This represents the first statistics that may indicate that
Plan Colombia is having a favorable effect on drug flows to the United States,
according to government agencies responsible for tracking drug trends.  Colombia
produces most6 of the world supply, with 90% of the cocaine entering the United
States originating in or transiting through Colombia.  The country also produces
significant quantities of high quality heroin.  
The supply of drugs is often judged by changes in price, with higher prices
signifying decreased supply.  In November 2005, the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) announced that from February to September 2005, prices for
cocaine increased 19% while purity decreased 15%.  This follows a long trend line,
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7 Lauren Monsen, “Colombia’s Efforts Help Reduce Supply of Narcotics in U.S.,”
Washington File, November 17, 2005; Office of National Drug Control Policy, Pulse Check,
January 2004; and U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National
Drug Threat Assessment 2004, April 2004.
8 National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2003 Monitoring the Future, December 2003, and 2004
Monitoring the Future, December 21, 2004.
9 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMSHA), Findings from
the 2003 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, September 2004.
10 Walsh, John M., Drug War Monitor: Are We There Yet?, Washington Office on Latin
America, December 2004.  (Hereafter cited as Walsh, Drug War Monitor.)
11 Juan Forero, “Cocaine Prices Rise and Quality Declines, White House Says,” The New
York Times, November 18, 2005.
12 John P. Walters, ONDCP, testimony before the House Government Reform Committee,
“A Status Report on Plan Colombia Successes and Remaining Challenges,” June 17, 2004.
“... we believe we will see a change in the availability in the United States in the next 12
months as a result of what happens here....  It takes some time between the planting and the
processing and the shipping and the dealing, we believe that will probably first appear in
reductions in purity, because most of the market for this product as you know is dependent
individuals.”
13 According to a 1994 study, coca leaf constitutes 2% of the retail price of cocaine.  James
Painter, Bolivia and Coca: A Study in Dependency, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
(continued...)
beginning in the early 1980s, of falling cocaine prices.  Earlier in the year, ONDCP
reported that the availability of South American heroin had also fallen, with heroin
prices increasing 30% and purity decreasing 22%.7  Heroin purity had been steadily
increasing since the 1980s.  Despite increasing prices, the National Institute on Drug
Abuse (NIDA) reported that drug use among young people has declined by 11% from
2001 to 2003, and again by 6% from 2003 to 2004.8  While these surveys report a
declining trend in overall drug use, they also report that the use of cocaine and heroin
has remained stable.  In fact, the National Survey on Drug Use and Health reported
that “There was no change in the overall rate of illicit drug use between 2002 and
2003.”9  The same report showed that cocaine and heroin use has remained stable
over the same time period at 2.3 million persons (not limited to young Americans)
and 119,000 users respectively.  Some observers criticize the value of these types of
surveys because they rely on self-reporting.10  
Some observers have expressed caution in interpreting the ONDCP figures on
price, purity, and availability.  They maintain that short-term fluctuations are not
uncommon and may not be sustainable.11  There are several reasons why prices and
supply remained stable for such a long period.  In testimony before Congress in June
2004, John P. Walters of ONDCP argued that interdiction efforts take time to show
their impact on price and availability, and that the effect would begin to show in the
next 12 months.12  Some argue that an increase in the street price of cocaine and
heroin is unlikely to appear in the near term because of the large profit margin.  Even
if the availability of coca leaf and opium poppies is decreasing, and consequently the
price for the raw materials is increasing, they constitute a very small fraction of the
U.S. retail price.  Traffickers are easily able to absorb this increased cost.13
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13 (...continued)
1994.  See also Kathryn Ledebur, “Bolivia: Clear Consequences” in Drugs and Democracy
in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, edited by Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen
Rosin, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005; and Walsh, Drug War Monitor.
14 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Drug Intelligence Briefing, Federal-Wide Drug Seizures
1999-2003, June 2004.
15 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2004 (covering
2003, released in March 2004), and International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2005
(covering 2004, released in March 2005).
16 For more information on eradication programs, see CRS Report RL33163, Drug Crop
Eradication and Alternative Development in the Andes, by Connie Veillette and Carolina
Navarrete-Frias.
17 ONDCP, 2004 Coca and Opium Poppy Estimates for Colombia and the Andes, March 25,
(continued...)
The interdiction of the final product, rather than the raw ingredients, imposes
greater costs on traffickers.  In June 2004, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
reported that domestic seizures of heroin had steadily increased from 1,152 kilograms
in 1999 to 2,351 kilograms in 2003.  Seizures of cocaine, both domestic and
maritime, have increased from 106,623 kilograms in 2000 to 115,725 kilograms in
2003.  Much of this gain is from maritime seizures in the South Atlantic and
Caribbean, and southwest Pacific regions.  Operation Panama Express, which targets
Colombian cocaine trafficking in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific oceans, resulted
in seizures of more than 15.7 metric tons since it began operations in February
2000.14  In Colombia, the Ministry of Defense reports cocaine seizures of 148 tons
in 2004, a 30% increase from 2003, and heroin seizures of 721 kilograms in 2004,
a 43.9% increase from 2003.
The State Department’s International Narcotics Strategy Report 2005 (INCSR)
credited the Air Bridge Denial (ABD) program (a joint U.S.-Colombian aerial
interdiction program) with the destruction of 13 aircraft, the capture of three aircraft
in Colombia and eight in Central America, and the seizure of about 3 metric tons of
cocaine in 2004.  This is in addition to the destruction of several aircraft and the
seizure of more than five metric tons of cocaine during 2003.  The U.S.-funded
Special Reconnaissance and Assault Unit of the Colombian Navy seized 12 metric
tons of cocaine, 12 kilograms of heroin, 17 “go-fast” boats, 34 outboard motor boats,
2 commercial fishing vessels, and 75 traffickers.  The Colombian Police Anti-
Narcotics Directorate (DIRAN) is credited with destroying 83 laboratories, and
seizing 48 metric tons of cocaine and cocaine base, 1,539 metric tons of solid
precursors and 755,588 gallons of liquid precursors.  (Solid and liquid precursors,
such as kerosene, are used to process coca leaf into cocaine base.)15
Cultivation of Drug Crops16
Both the State Department and United Nations report decreases in acreage
devoted to growing drug crops since 2001, although the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP) recently reported no significant reduction of coca




18 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2004 World Drug Report, June 2004.  While
the State Department reports that 323,400 acres were sprayed in 2004, the United Nations
reports that there were 212,506 acres of coca under cultivation by the end of 2003.  The
difference could be due to different survey methodology used, or to replantings.  Spraying
does not prevent, although it may discourage, replantings of illicit crops.
19 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region: A Survey of
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, June 2005.  The report also noted increases of 17% in Bolivia
and 14% in Peru.
aerial eradication of coca and poppy crops.  (See the tables below for eradication and
cultivation statistics.)  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
estimates that at the end of 2003, Colombia had 212,506 acres of coca under
cultivation, having reduced its production by 47% since 2000.  Opium poppy under
cultivation covered about 10,000 acres, from 16,000 acres in 2000.18 In 2004,
ONDCP reports that 337,000 acres of coca and 27,000 acres of opium poppy were
sprayed.  However, its recently completed survey concluded that the area under
cultivation for coca remained stable in 2004, due to replantings of previously
eradicated crops. Although the 282,000 acres of existing coca crops remained stable,
ONDCP argues that cocaine production fell from 460 to 430 metric tons in the
previous year because newly-planted crops are less productive. Opium poppy
cultivation decreased by 52% between 2003 and 2004.  The UNODC recently
reported that cultivation in 2004 had decreased by 7%.19 
In order to induce growers to give up illicit crops, ACI funding supports
alternative development programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International
Development.  The State Department reports that 12,845 families benefitted from this
type of assistance in 2004, and a total of 44,015 families have benefitted since 2001.
The program supported  the development of 40,791 acres of licit crops in 2004, and
136,000 acres since 2001.  In 2004, USAID completed 244 infrastructure projects,
bringing the total to 874 since 2001. 
Table 1.  Eradication of Drug Crops, 1999-2004
(in hectares and acres)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004




























Source:  U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports, covering 2003
and 2004.
The eradication program, including the aerial fumigation of crops, has been
controversial.  Criticism has centered on the possible environmental and health
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20 Lisa Haugaard, Adam Isacson, Kimberly Stanton, John Walsh and Jeff Vogt, “Blueprint
for a New Colombia Policy,” March 2005, and Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, “The
U.S. ‘War on Drugs’: Its Impact in Latin America and the Caribbean,” in Drugs and
Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.
21 Maria Clemencia Ramirez Lemus, Kimberly Stanton and John Walsh, “Colombia: A
Vicious Circle of Drugs and War,” in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact
of U.S. Policy, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.
22 Robin Emmott, “Colombia Cocaine Purge Drives Up Peru Drug Output,” Reuters, January
8, 2005.  Fernando Hurtado, deputy head of DEVIDA, the government anti-narcotics
agency, was quoted: “Coca eradication in Colombia has been successful, but less coca
means prices rise and drug traffickers are coming to Peru to plant.”
23 Ibid.  UNODC.  See also, “War And Drugs in Colombia,” International Crisis Group,
January 27, 2005, and “Going to Extremes: The U.S. Funded Aerial Eradication Program
in Colombia,” Latin American Working Group, March 2003.
effects of the fumigant used, and on the pace of development programs to provide
farmers with alternatives to drug crop cultivation.  Some critics argue that the ratio
of security assistance to alternative development programs is skewed too heavily in
favor of the former.  They contend that more resources need to be devoted to
development as the only sustainable method to reduce drug crop cultivation in the
long run.20  They believe the focus on counternarcotics at the level of coca cultivation
causes serious problems for growers who rely on illicit crops for their livelihoods.
They contend that spray drift has destroyed licit crops and that growers seeking
compensation, as provided by law, are regularly denied benefits.21 Some observers
also contend that eradication of crops in one area results in their displacement to
other areas, and they cite coca production increases in Bolivia of 17% in 2003.  In the
same period, cultivation in Peru dropped 15%.  In 2004, cultivation increased slightly
in Bolivia and fell slightly in Peru, according to ONDCP.  This information counters
the prediction of an official with Peru’s anti-narcotics agency that acreage devoted
to growing coca probably increased in 2004 and that further increases could be
expected in 2005.22 
Some observers believe that reporting the acreage of crops sprayed does not
reflect actual cultivation, and that the technology used does not produce accurate
assessments.  Fumigation causes defoliation, but does not always kill the plant.
Further, spraying does not prevent, although it may discourage, the replantings of
illicit crops.  Surveys of the area under cultivation conducted by the United States
often differ from those of the United Nations.  (See tables below.)  According to U.S.
government sources, the acreage under coca cultivation has dropped by 7% since
1999, while the United Nations shows a 50% decrease.  There are also indications
that growers are resorting to smaller plots, and are interspersing them with legitimate
crops, making the aerial imaging of plantings difficult.  The UNODC reported that
the size of single plots had decreased, with the majority on plots of 7.4 acres or less.23
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24 Mauricio Cárdenas, Ximena Cadena, and Carlos Caballero, “Análisis del Incremento en
el Gasto en Defensa y Seguridad: Resultados y Sostenibilidad de la Estrategia,” Fundación
Seguridad y Democracia, February 2005.  (Hereafter cited as Cardenas, et al., 2005.)
Table 2.  Land Under Coca and Poppy Cultivation in Colombia,
1999-2004 — U.S. State Department and ONDCP Sources
(in hectares and acres)





























Sources:  U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports covering years
20001, 2002, and 2003, and 2004; figures for 2004 are from the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, “2004 Coca and Opium Poppy Estimates for Colombia and the Andes,” March 2005.
Table 3.  Land Under Coca and Poppy Cultivation in Colombia, 
1999-2004 — UNODC Surveys
(in hectares and acres)





























Source:  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region: A
Survey of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, June 2005, and World Drug Report, 2004.
Violence and Crime
Most observers agree that public safety conditions in Colombia have improved.
Police have been redeployed to areas from which they had been previously ousted by
armed groups, and now have a presence in every municipality.  A greater security
presence has significantly given Colombians more confidence to travel by road.
According to the State Department, the Colombian National Police has trained and
deployed 9,176 officers to rural areas, 8,166 to protect major roadways, and 397 to
defend 12 of the country’s 16 petroleum pipelines.  Although the rate of kidnappings
has decreased significantly, Colombia still has the highest kidnapping rate in the
world.  Various studies conclude that the cost of the armed conflict to the Colombian
economy is between 3% and 7% of GDP.24
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25 “Paramilitary Demobilisation Rescheduled,” Latinnews Daily, November 22, 2005, and
Human Rights Watch, “Colombia Demobilization Scheme Ensures Injustice,” January 18,
2005.






Kidnappings for Extortion -49%
Illegal Road Blocks (Jan.-Oct.) -62%
Source:  Ministry of Defense, Government of Colombia.
Armed Conflict
A major goal of the Colombian government is to end the armed conflict that has
plagued the country for more than 40 years.  Several illegally armed groups of both
the right and left operate in the country and derive profit from participating in the
drug trade.  The two main leftist guerrilla groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN).  Most of the rightist
paramilitary groups are coordinated by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC).  The AUC, with estimated membership ranging from 12,000 to 19,000, has
agreed to demobilize, resulting in their planned disbandment by the end of 2005.
Legislation that would provide for conditional sentencing for their human rights
abuses and other crimes, as well as their reintegration into society, was approved by
the Colombian legislature, and the demobilization process has been proceeding.  The
new Peace and Justice Law has been controversial in both Colombia and the United
States.  Critics believe it is too lenient and could interfere with the U.S.-Colombia
extradition treaty.  Supporters believe it is the only possible way to end paramilitary
activities.  It is estimated that about half of AUC members have demobilized, leaving
10,000 yet to lay down their arms.25 
Negotiations with the FARC have not taken place under the Uribe
Administration, since the FARC has refused Uribe’s demands that they first agree to
a cease-fire and demobilization.  The FARC controls vast territory in the country,
mainly in the southern and eastern regions.  There is conflicting evidence of FARC
resources, most likely due to the difficulty in determining the extent of their business
activities.  The United Nations estimates that the FARC’s average annual income is
$342 million of which $204 million comes from the drug trade.  However, the
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26 United Nations Development Program, National Human Development Report 2003:
Solutions to Escape the Conflict’s Impasse, October 8, 2004, and “Las Cuentas de las Farc,”
Semana.com, January 30, 2005.
27 “FARC Losing Battle to Colombian Government, Analyst Says,” BBC, October 13, 2004.
28 Juan Pablo Toro, “Colombian General Says Rebels on the Run,” Associated Press,
February 3, 2005, Steven Dudley, “Rebels Kill 15 in Raid on Navy Base,” The Miami
Herald, February 2, 2005, Juan Forero, “Image Offensive: Rebels Undercut Colombian
President,” New York Times, February 12, 2005, “Rebels Kill 17 Colombian Troops With
Mines, Guns,” Reuters, April 7, 2005.
Colombian Finance Ministry reports FARC revenue in 2003 at $77.16 million, of
which drug trafficking accounted for $11.54 million.26  
In mid-2003, the Colombian military’s Plan Patriota, a campaign to recapture
FARC-held territory, began operations to secure the capital and environs of Bogotá
from FARC attack.  This phase was largely seen as successful, based on the decrease
in kidnappings and roadblocks in the region.  In 2004, military operations, conducted
by up to 17,000 troops, turned to regaining FARC territory in the southern and
eastern regions of the country.  Anecdotal evidence indicates that the Colombian
military has forced the FARC to change tactics by atomizing into smaller cells to
avoid detection and reducing the number of large-scale attacks on military facilities.27
However, renewed FARC attacks on military facilities and other military
engagements in 2005 indicate an offensive capability.
The Colombian military claims that Plan Patriota has reduced FARC ranks
from 18,000 to 12,000 in the past year.28  Information provided by the Office of the
Colombian President reports that the campaign was able to take back control of 11
FARC-run villages, destroy more than 400 FARC camps, capture 1,534 explosive
devices and 323 gas-cylinder bombs, kill 2,518 combatants, and capture large
amounts of ammunition and weapons.  With regard to FARC drug trafficking
activities, as of September 2004, it was reported that the Colombian military located
and destroyed more than 47 tons of solid chemical supplies, 18,000 gallons of liquid
precursors, half a ton of cocaine base, and $34,000 in cash.
The smaller ELN, which some observers believe is less involved in the drug
trade, has been more amenable to talks with the government.  Both the ELN and the
Colombian government accepted a 2004 Mexican offer to facilitate peace
negotiations, although a cease-fire is not in effect. However, in April 2005, the ELN
rejected Mexican facilitation after Mexico voted to condemn Cuba at the U.N.
Human Rights Commission. The ELN agreed in November 2005 to begin discussions
with the government, and meetings occurred in Cuba in December, with plans for
more talks in January. 
With regard to Plan Patriota, critics argue that because the territory is so rugged
and inaccessible, complete defeat of the FARC may be impossible.  They further
point to the campaign’s negative effects on the civilian population by measuring the
number of internally displaced persons (IDP).  There are conflicting reports on IDP
levels.  The Colombian government reports that displaced persons dropped 37% from
2003, while a Colombian human rights groups reported that levels increased 39%
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from 208,000 in 2003 to 289,000 in 2004, many of whom have not registered with
the Colombian government as displaced.29  The Department of Defense reports that
Southern Command (Southcom) is supporting the development of a civil affairs
capability of the Colombian military to mitigate the negative impact of military
operations, and to integrate humanitarian assistance into military planning.
Some critics of U.S. policy believe that assistance to the Colombian military
serves to increase its autonomy from civilian authority, and provides a rationale for
the military to be concerned with internal enemies, in the form of drug traffickers,
rather than external threats, the standard function of militaries.  This is of particular
concern in Latin America where militaries have often intervened in civilian politics.
Critics contend that the United States should not be expanding the role of foreign
militaries to perform functions that would not be in line with its own laws or those
of other democracies.  (The U.S. Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 established the
principle prohibiting the use of the armed forces in law enforcement activities.)
According to this argument, U.S. assistance counters other U.S. objectives, such as
to promote democracy by ensuring civilian control of the military.  Instead, it blurs
the distinction between police and military functions.30
Economic Development
Confidence in the economy has increased with the improved security situation,
although some observers believe the country’s economic rebound may be stalling.31
The World Bank characterizes Colombia as a middle income country, with per capita
GDP of $7,040 in 2003, according to the U.N. Development Program.  GDP growth
was 3.5% in 2004 with an inflation rate of 5.5%.  It is estimated that the drug trade
contributes between 2.0% and 2.5% to Colombia’s annual GDP.32  Colombia had the
best performing stock market in the world in 2004.  Colombian exports help the
economic situation, especially the benefits it receives under the Andean Trade
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act.  Colombia, with Peru and Ecuador, is currently
negotiating a free trade agreement with the United States.  
Colombia has been an important petroleum exporter, but the armed conflict has
led to production decreases.  Oil exports are its largest single source of foreign
revenue, accounting for 28% of export revenues and 10% of government revenues
in 2003.  Production declined to 560,206 barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2003 from a high
of 830,000 bbl/d in 1999.  It exported 195,000 barrels per day to the United States
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in 2003, a decrease of 25% from 2002.  This follows a 13.5% decline the previous
year.33  Both the FARC and ELN have targeted energy production and transportation
infrastructure.  A major target has been the 490-mile Caño Limón Coveñas oil
pipeline.  In 2001, it was bombed 170 times resulting in shutdowns for seven months
at a cost of approximately $500 million in revenues and royalties to Colombia.  Since
then, there has been a marked decrease in attacks.  Aggressive exploration of new
reserves has been hindered by the fighting and the lack of effective government
control of all parts of the country.  Colombian officials have warned that the country
could soon become a net importer of oil if no new significant fields are found.
Table 5.  Attacks on Oil Pipelines, 2001-2004
2001 2002 2003 2004
Caño Limón Coveñas 170 41 34 17
All Pipelines 263 74 179 103
Source:  Ministry of Defense, Government of Colombia.
Promotion of Democracy, Rule of Law, and Human Rights
The promotion of democracy and rule of law, and respect for human rights are
shared components of both Colombian and U.S. objectives for Plan Colombia.  The
State Department’s annual report on human rights for 2004 reported that some
progress had been made, but that serious problems remained.  In 2004, there were
between 3,000 and 4,000 civilian deaths due to the armed conflict.  While the civilian
judiciary is considered independent of the executive branch, it is reported to be
“overburdened, inefficient, and subject to intimidation and corruption by terrorist
groups and common criminals.”34  The State Department report recognized that the
security forces were under the effective control of civilian authorities, but that there
were still instances in which members of the security forces committed serious
violations of human rights, including cooperation with paramilitary groups.  Labor
union leaders continued to be targeted by illegally armed groups, hindering trade
union activities, but killings of trade union leaders declined 25% during 2004.
The U.S. Agency for International Development supports programs to
modernize the criminal justice system, promote human rights, strengthen local
government, and increase transparency.  Thirty-seven “justice houses,” providing
access to legal services, have been created, handling about 2.7 million cases since
2001.  USAID also helped establish 35 oral trial courtrooms, and provided training
for judges in oral trials, legal evidence and procedures.  The establishment of oral
courtrooms is part of a larger effort to transition Colombia’s judicial system from a
Napoleonic to an accusatorial system, that it is believed will also improve its
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efficiency.  Transparency International, a non-governmental organization that
monitors corruption, reported that Colombia’s ranking in its annual survey had
improved by 17% between 2000 and 2003.
Non-governmental organizations monitoring human rights have consistently
criticized the State Department for certifying that the Colombian government is
making progress with regard to human rights.  U.S. law requires that the Secretary
of State annually certify that the Colombian military is suspending any personnel
credibly alleged to have committed human rights violations or to have aided
paramilitaries; that the government is cooperating with human rights investigations
and is prosecuting those involved in violations; and that steps are being take to sever
links between the military and paramilitaries and dismantle paramilitary leadership
and financial networks.  Critics point to the State Department’s own annual human
rights report indicating that there is still collusion between paramilitaries and
members of Colombia’s security forces and that little progress has been made on a
number of pending investigations.  Human rights organizations have also expressed
alarm at the passage of anti-terrorism legislation that grants Colombia’s security
forces increased powers to detain suspects for up to 36 hours, to search homes, and
to tap phones, without a legal warrant.  In September 2004, the country’s
constitutional court ruled the legislation unconstitutional.
Regional Stability
A justification for U.S. policy in the region is that drug trafficking, with its
money laundering and corruptive influences, and armed insurgencies in Colombia
have a destabilizing effect on the region.  With porous borders amid rugged territory,
and an inconsistent state presence in some areas, border regions are seen as
particularly problematic.  Colombia shares lengthy borders with Venezuela, Peru and
Brazil, and much shorter borders with Ecuador and Panama.  The State Department’s
2004 Patterns of Global Terrorism report states that Venezuela “continued to be
unwilling or unable to assert control over its 1,400-mile border with Colombia,” with
the FARC and ELN using Venezuelan territory as safehavens, and to transship arms
and drugs, secure logistical supplies, and commit kidnappings and extortion.  The
situation has at various times heightened tension between Colombia and Venezuela,
the most recent tensions due to the kidnapping of a FARC official in Venezuela, who
then turned up in Colombian custody.  Tensions with Ecuador have also increased,
with accusations of incursions by Colombian troops chasing FARC units across the
border.  Ecuador also is affected by a flow of displaced Colombians fleeing the
fighting in the south of Colombia, according to an organization that monitors human
rights in Colombia.35
Prospects for U.S. Disengagement
Plan Colombia was presented to Congress as a six-year plan, and several
committees have held hearings since in 2003 to assess its progress.  Despite some
expectations that U.S. support for Plan Colombia would end, or begin to decrease in
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FY2006, U.S. and Colombian officials have argued that significant progress has been
made, but that more needs to be done.36  Colombia has developed a follow-up plan,
yet to be publicly released, that would entail continued international support.
There has been measurable progress in Colombia’s internal security, as
measured by decreases in violence, and in the eradication of drug crops.  Recent price
increases for heroin and cocaine in the United States may indicate that supply is
being affected. Military operations against illegally armed groups have intensified,
but the main leftist guerrilla group has neither been defeated, nor brought closer to
wanting to enter peace negotiations.  The demobilization of rightist paramilitary
fighters is proceeding, but the new Peace and Justice Law has been criticized for
being too lenient on AUC members who have committed gross violations of human
rights and drug trafficking crimes.  
While the demobilization process holds the promise of removing up to 19,000
fighters from the conflict, Congress has expressed concerns that the process ensures
that illegally armed groups are dismantled, deters members from resuming illegal
activities, and holds accountable those who have violated human rights and
committed other crimes.  The FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-
447) recommended that the State Department not request funding for demobilization
until the Department of Justice determines that the process is consistent with U.S.
anti-terrorism laws, that the demobilizing groups are respecting a cease-fire and
cessation of illegal activities, and that the legal framework eventually adopted not
prevent the extradition of suspected criminals to the United States.  
The FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102) provided
$20 million for the demobilization process but conditioned it on a certification from
the Secretary of State.  The certification must demonstrate that assistance will only
be provided for individuals who have terminated their association with foreign
terrorist organizations (FTOs) and who are meeting the requirements of Colombia’s
demobilization law.  It must also include assurances that the Colombian government
is cooperating with the United States on extraditions and is implementing a workable
framework for dismantling FTOs.  U.S. funds can only be used for verification,
reintegration, vetting, recovery of assets for reparations of victims, and investigations
and prosecutions.
Some Members of Congress have urged the “Colombianization” of the program,
under which Colombian security forces would assume the operational capabilities to
take over functions now provided by the United States.  General James T. Hill
testified to Congress in 2004, when he was the head of the U.S. Southern Command,
that the capabilities of the Colombian military had measurably improved, as
evidenced by Plan Patriota.37  On the other hand, the Government Accountability
Office reported in 2003 that Colombia was not capable of assuming more
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responsibilities in the near future, despite U.S. training programs.38  The Colombian
government is now spending more on its security forces than ever (4.5% of GDP),
but some observers doubt the sustainability of the effort without fiscal reforms.39  The
House-passed FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (H.R. 3057/H.Rept.
109-152) included report language that expressed concern with the Colombian
government’s ability to assume more operational and maintenance functions of Plan
Colombia.
Some Members believe the international community should be providing more
support for Plan Colombia.  The Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House
International Relations Committee held hearings on the topic on November 18, 2004.
Rates of cocaine abuse have increased in Europe, yet critics argue that Europe has not
provided sufficient levels of assistance.  The Colombian Agency for International
Cooperation reported that the European Union and its member states spent about
$120 million in Colombia in 2003.40  At a February 3-4, 2005 international donors
conference held in Cartegena, Colombia, attended by the United States, Europe,
Japan, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, the Colombian government
presented its demobilization plan and the need for international support.  It is
estimated that the AUC demobilization will cost about $160 million.41  Donors
expressed support for the demobilization process, but insisted that Colombia adopt
a legal framework that ensures demobilized fighters are prosecuted for crimes, citing
the need for “truth, justice, and reparations,” before aid would be committed.42
